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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,

\

Plaintiff and Respondent, (

vs.

}

JAMES W. RODGERS,

Case No.
8868

\

Defendant and Appellant. }

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in defendant's brief
is substantially correct and fairly represents the facts in
this case.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER BASED UPON AN INFORMATION FILED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
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CHARGING THE DEFENDANT WITH THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF "MURDER
IN THE FIRST DEGREE" FOLLOWING THE
FILING OF A COMPLAINT CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH "MURDER" UPON WHICH
A PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HAD BY
DEFENDANT THAT RESULTED IN HIS BEING BOUND OVER TO THE DISTRICT COURT
TO STAND TRIAL FOR "MURDER" DID NOT
VIOLATE THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH NOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE
LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN SO FINDING.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH
THE INFORl\IATION MADE AT THE TIME
OF ARRAIGNMENT AND BEFORE PLEA ON
THEGROUNDSTHATTHEDEFENDANTDID
NOT HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING ON
THE CHARGE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER
AND THAT THE COURT THEREFORE 'YAS
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE
CASE.
POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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QUASH THE INFORMATION OR IN LIEU
THEREOF TO AMEND SAME TO CONFORM
TO THE CHARGE THAT WAS MADE IN THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE CHARGE
FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS BOUND
OVER BY THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE
TO STAND TRIAL.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY TESTIMONY
WITH RESPECT TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST
OF JUDGMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:
(A) THAT THE DEFENDANT IS INSANE, AND,
(B) THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TRY THE DEFENDANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
THE FIRST DEGREE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT
WITH WHAT CONSTITUTES THE CRIME OF
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE; THAT
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THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS BASED
UPON SAID COMPLAINT AND THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS BOUND OVER BY THE
COMMITTING MAGISTRATE TO STAND
TRIAL FOR THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE
COMPLAINT TO WIT: MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
POINT VI.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL IN THAT THE VERDICT RENDERED IN THIS CASE IS SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND FURTHER THAT THE
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE
JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT INSANE AND INCAPABLE
OF CONTROLLING HIS ACTIONS BY REASON
OF AN ORGANIC MENTAL DISORDER.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER BASED UPON AN INFORMATION FILED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
CHARGING THE DEFENDANT WITH THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF "MURDER
IN THE FIRST DEGREE" FOLLOWING THE
FILING OF A COMPLAINT CHARGING DESponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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FENDANT WITH "MURDER" UPON WHICH
A PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HAD BY
DEFENDANT THAT RESULTED IN HIS BEING BOUND OVER TO THE DISTRICT COURT
TO STAND TRIAL FOR "MURDER" DID NOT
VIOLATE THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH NOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE
LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN SO FINDING.
Section 77-11-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides that a cornplaint upon which a criminal prosecution is initiated shall
include the following:
"77-11-1.
state:

CONTENTS.-The complaint must

"* * *
"(3) The general name of the crime or public
offense.

" ( 4) The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the crime or public offense named.
* * *"
This Court, in construing Section 8680, Comp. Laws
Utah 1917, which was identical insofar as the above quoted
portions of 77-11-1 are concerned, held as follows:
"The purposes of a complaint are two-fold: To
advise the defendant of the charge made against him
and to enable the committing magistrate to determine whether or not the defendant should be bound
over to the district court to stand trial for the offense charged in the complaint. While a complaint
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need not charge a crime with the fullness and particularity required in an information or indictment
it must be in substantial compliance with the provi~
sions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 8680; * * * "
State v. Hale, 71 U. 134, 263 P. 86.
In an earlier case, State v. Anderson, 35 U. 496, 101 P.
385, this Court, in interpreting identical statutory provisions as those above quoted, opined thus:

"* * * We do not understand the law to be
that a complaint, which is made the basis of a preliminary hearing before a magistrate only, must be
drawn with the same precision and technical accuracy that is required in the drawing of an indictment or information upon which a party charged
with a felony is finally brought to trial, * * *."
The defendant cites the case of State v. Pay, 45 U. 411,
146 P. 300, in support of his position, when in fact the case
is directly in point with the above cases. In this case the
Court states as follows with respect to the sufficiency of
a complaint:
"[5, 6] Of course, the offense need not be
stated in technical language nor in such specific
terms as is 'required in an information or an indictment. It is sufficient that the jurisdictional facts
appear and that the crime is stated in ordinary
language. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
It is thus evident that this Court has given effect to

the clear statutory language contained in Section 77-11-1,
U. C. A. 1953. The "general name of the crime or public
offense" is sufficient thereunder. That the term "murder"
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as charged in a complaint is a "general" term embracing all
statutory degrees thereof can hardly be doubted. Section
76-30-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides as follows:
"76-30-1. "MURDER" DEFINED.-Murder is
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought."
This is simply a codification of the common law definition
of murder. State v. Russell, 106 U. 116, 145 P. 2d 1003. As
such it includes all present degrees of murder and an indictment for murder at common law does charge murder in the
first degree. Davis v. Utah Territory, 151 U. S. 262, 38 L.
Ed. 153, 14 S. Ct. 328; Green v. Commonwealth, (Supreme
Judicial Court of Mass.), 12 Allen, 155, 170; People v. Murray, 10 California 309, 310; People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62,
70; State v. Lessing, 16 Minn. 64, 66, 67; State v. Verrill,
54 Maine 408, 415; Gehrke v. State, 13 Texas 568, 573, 574;
McAdams v. State, 25 Ark. 405, 416. In the Davis case the
Supreme Court of the United States, in construing territorial statutes identical with those of the State of Utah
today, resolved the question thus, at pages 266 and 267 of
151 U. S. Reports:
"Other assignments of error present the objection that the indictment is so framed that it will not
support a verdict of guilty of murder in the first
degree. This objection is based, in part, upon the
theory that murder in the first degree and murder
in the second degree are made distinct, separate offenses. But this is an erroneous interpretation of the
statute. The crime defined is that of murder. The
statute divides that crime into two classes in order
that the punishment may be adjusted with reference
to the presence or absence of circumstances of ag-
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gravation. And, therefore, whenever a crime is distinguished into degrees, it is left to the jury, if they
convict the defendant, 'to find the degree of the
crime of which he is guilty.' 2 Comp. Laws of Utah,
715, § 5076. * * * An indictment which clearly
and distinctly alleges facts showing a murder by the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethough is good as an indictment for murder under
the Utah statutes, although it may not indicate, upon
its face, in terms, the degree of that crime, and
thereby the nature of the punishment that may be
inflicted. * * * As the acts which, under tke
Utah statute, constitute murder, whether of tke
highest or lowest degree, constituted murder at common law, it is clear that an indictment good at common law as an indictment for murder, in whatever
mode or under 'Whatever circumstances of atrocity
the crime may have been committed, is sufficient for
any degree of the crime of murder under a statute relating to murder as defined at common law, andestablishing degrees of that crime in order that the
punishment may be adapted to the special circumstances of each case." (Emphasis added.)
We quote further from the Davis case at page 269, wherein
Justice Harlan quotes from the Massachusetts case of Green
v. Commonwealth, supra:
" 'The reason on which these decisions were
founded was this: that the statute establishing degrees of murder did not create any new offense or
change the definition of murder as it was understood
at common law; that the forms of indictment previously in use descriptive of murder embodied every
shade or degree of the crime, from that which was
most aggravated, malicious, and premeditated down
to that which had only the element of implied malice
in its most mitigated form; and that as the offense
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was not changed, but only its punishment mitigated
in certain cases, the indictment was sufficient to
embrace every species of murder, whether it fell
within one or the other of the degrees of homicide
as defined by the statute. The logical and necessary
conclusion from these discussions is, that an indictment for murder at common law does charge murder
in the first degree.'"
We feel that the above authorities are controlling upon
the question of whether the Legislature has created separate crimes of first and second degree murder as contended
by defendant, and that a complaint charging "murder"
upon which a defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing
and subsequently is bound over to the District Court to
stand trial is sufficient to charge the defendant with murder
in the first degree upon an information filed by the District
Attorney.
It is interesting to note that the defendant makes no
attempt to challenge the sufficiency of the information in
charging first degree murder upon which his conviction was
based. And yet every case cited by defendant to support
his position resolves itself into a determination of the sufficiency of an indictment or information.

Defendant quotes at length from the case of State v.
Spencer, 101 U. 274, 117 P. 2d 455, rehearing denied 101
U. 287, 121 P. 2d 912, wherein the Court held that perjury
in the first degree and perjury in the second degree are
distinct and separate crimes and that an information charging "perjury" does not charge a crime or public offense.
The Court was divided 3-2 in its opinion in this case. How-
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ever, the defendant fails to point out that this decision has
been specifically overruled by a unanimous court in the
case of State v. Hutchinson, 4 U. 2d 404, 295 P. 2d 345. In
this latter case, the Court, speaking through Justice Henriod, stated at page 346 of 295 P. 2d:
"Without determining the debatable question as
to whether this language was dictum or not [in the
Spencer case], logic would dictate that without such
language the conclusion is almost inescapable that
one offense was included in the other and an accusation of perjury, without specifying the degree,
would have been sufficient, since applicable statutes
seem to say so and actually authorize charging perjury in the following form: 'A. B. committed perjury by testifying as follows.'" (Emphasis added.)
The "applicable statutes" referred to by the Court are Sections 77-21-8, 77-21-38, and 77-21-47, U. C. A. 1953, which
are herewith set forth:
"77-21-8. CHARGING THE OFFENSE.-(1)
The information or indictment may charge, and is
valid and sufficient if it charges the offense for
which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or
more of the following ways:
" (a) By using the name given to the offense
by the common law or by a statute.
"(b) By stating so much of the definition of
the offense, either in terms of the common law or of
the statute defining the offense or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give
the court and the defendant notice of what offense
is intended to be charged.
"(2) The information or indictment may refer
to a section or subsection of any statute creating the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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offense charged therein, and in determining the
validity or sufficiency of such information or indictment regard shall be had to such reference."
"77-21-38. OFFENSES DIVIDED INTO DEGREES.-In an information or indictment for an
offense which is divided into degrees it is sufficient
to charge that the defendant committed the offense
without specifying the degree."
"77-21-47. FORMS FOR CERTAIN OFFENSES.-The following forms may be used in the cases
in which they are applicable :
"* * *
"Murder-A. B. murdered C. D.

"Perjury-A. B. committed perjury by testifying as follows: (set forth the testimony). * * *"
It is apparent that this Court overruled the Spencer case in
order to give effect to the plain language and legislative
intent evidenced by the above statutory provisions which
are applicable with identical effect upon either of the penal
statutes relating to perjury or murder. By substituting the
word "murder" in the place of "perjury" in the above
quoted portion of the Hutchinson case we must conclude
that even an information charging murder without specifying the degree, which is not the fact of this case, would be
sufficient under Utah law.
In view of the above authorities we feel that this Court
must find that the complaint filed in this case and the defendant's subsequent conviction of murder in the first
degree are not contrary to and in violation of the laws of
the State of Utah and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
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With respect to defendant's claim that the acts complained of are contrary to and in violation of Article V and
Article VI of the Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, let it suffice to state that the first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution apply to the procedure and
trial of causes in the federal courts and are not limitations
on those in state courts. Gaines v. Washington, 48 S. Ct.
468, 277 U. S. 81, 72 L. Ed. 793. And this is true in the
case of the Fifth Amendment. Feldman v. United States
(New York), 64 S. Ct. 1082, 322 U.S. 487, 88 L. Ed. 1408,
154 A. L. R. 982, rehearing denied 65 S. Ct. 26, 323 U. S.
811, 89 L. Ed. 646; Graffe v. United States, (C. C. A.,
Utah) 49 F. 2d 270, certiorari denied 52 S. Ct. 24, 284 U.
S. 644, 76 L. Ed. 548. It is also true in the case of the Sixth
Amendment. People v. Raffington, 98 Cal. App. 2d 455,
220 P. 2d 967, certiorari denied 71 S. Ct. 292, 340 U.S. 912,
95 L. Ed. 659.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH
THE INFORMATION MADE AT THE TIME
OF ARRAIGNMENT AND BEFORE PLEA ON
THE GROUNDS THAT THE DEFENDANT DID
NOT HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING ON
THE CHARGE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER
AND THAT THE COURT THEREFORE WAS
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE
CASE.
The plaintiff relies upon the argument contained under
Point I to sustain its position that the lower court did not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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err in denying defendant's motion to quash the information
made at the time of arraignment and before plea upon the
grounds that defendant did not have a preliminary hearing
on the charge of first degree murder and that the Court
therefore was without jurisdiction to hear the case.

POINT III.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
QUASH THE INFORMATION OR IN LIEU
THEREOF TO AMEND SAME TO CONFORM
TO THE CHARGE THAT WAS MADE IN THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE CHARGE
FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS BOUND
OVER BY THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE
TO STAND TRIAL.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY TESTIMONY
WITH RESPECT TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST
OF JUDGMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:
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(A) THAT THE DEFENDANT IS INSANE, AND,
(B) THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TRY THE DEFENDANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
THE FIRST DEGREE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT
WITH WHAT CONSTITUTES THE CRIME OF
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE; THAT
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS BASED
UPON SAID COMPLAINT AND THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS BOUND OVER BY THE
COMMITTING MAGISTRATE TO STAND
TRIAL FOR THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE
COMPLAINT TO WIT: MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
The plaintiff incorporates its argument under Point
I insofar as it relates to the sufficiency of the pleadings
and constitutional rights and guarantees of the defendant
in answer to Points III, IV and V contained in defendant's
brief.
POINT VI.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL IN THAT THE VERDICT RENDERED IN THIS CASE IS SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND FURTHER THAT THE
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE
JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFENSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
DANT WAS NOT INSANE AND INCAPABLE
OF CONTROLLING HIS ACTIONS BY REASON
OF AN ORGANIC MENTAL DISORDER.
Defendant contends that the evidence introduced at
his trial is uncontradicted that he was acting under an
irresistible impulse produced by mental disease and, therefore, the defense of insanity, as a matter of law, is available to him under the doctrine established in State v. Green,
78 U. 580, 6 P. 2d 177. Defendant relies solely upon testimony to the effect that upon two separate Kolmer Compliment Fixation tests, a form of spinal serology for syphilis,
upon which positive reactions of three plus and two plus
were obtained in tests made upon defendant, as proof of
organic syphilitic infection of his central nervous system.
Upon this evidence he attempts to establish that he acted
under an irresistible impulse resulting from a mental disease. Such was the expert opinion testimony of Doctors
John Landward and Craig Nelson, both of whom testified
on defendant's behalf.

t
(\.

In addition to the spinal fluid tests referred to above,
two separate samples of defendant's blood were subjected
to four separate tests for syphilis, namely the V. D. R. L.
(used by the Venereal Disease Laboratory of the U.S. Public Health Service), Kahn Standard, Hinton, and Kolmar
Compliment Fixation tests, all of which were negative, or
non-reactive (R. 309-310, 318-319). Defendant's witness
Dr. Chester B. Powell, a specialist in the field of neurology
and neuro-surgery, in commenting upon the opposite results
obtained in the tests made upon defendant's spinal fluid
and blood, testified that "About three percent on the aver-
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age of patients with syphilis of the nervous system will
show a negative blood serology" (R. 324). Furthermore, he
testified that the defendant "doesn't have any prominent
clinical signs of syphilis" (R. 325). He also mentioned the
possibility of a "false positive" spinal fluid test reaction but
noted that this is "exceedingly rare", and, after ruling out
the known causes of false positive serology, concluded that
the defendant was suffering from syphilitic infection of
the centrol nervous system (R. 325-326). Upon cross examination he admitted that his interview with the defendant did not reveal any abnormality as to judgment, memory and other intellectual functions nor did his electro encephalograph test of the defendant indicate any abnormality of the brain wave pattern (R. 330-331). Dr. Powell also
testified that persons may have syphilis of the brain and
be "perfectly responsible" without necessarily acting under
hallucinations, and most such patients do know the difference between right and wrong, and such a condition doesn't
mean that the individual doesn't know the nature of his
acts ( R. 332-333) . He also testified that upon questioning
the defendant, the latter had stated that he had never had
syphilis nor been treated for it (R. 333). And that the
patient had no signs of congenital spyhilis (R. 334).
The above noted evidence is representative of what
defendant terms "uncontradicted evidence" that the defendant was suffering from an organic mental disease which
rendered him insane and incapable of controlling his action~. This Court is asked to hold, as a matter of law, that
a :v.;., possibility (syphilis diagnosis upon positive spinal
fluid tc~t and negative blood test) constituted uncontra--
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dieted evidence of organic disease in defendant's central
nervous system such that he could not suppress an irresistible impulse, and that the jury could not give credence to
the following :
The 97% norm of diagnosis (spinal fluid test and
blood test confirming each other) ,
1.

2.

The absence of clinical signs of syphilis in defen-

dant,
3. The possibility of a "false positive" spinal fluid
test reaction,
4. The lack of any observed abnormalities in the realm
of judgment, memory and other intellectual functions evidenced by defendant's behavior,
5. The failure of the electro encephalograph test to
reveal any brain wave abnormality in defendant,
6. The probability that, even assuming organic disease of the central nervous system, the afflicted individual
does know right from wrong, does know the nature of his
actions and does not necessarily act under hallucinations,
7. The defendant's own statements to the above witness that he had never had syphilis nor been treated for it,
and
8. The absence of any signs of congenital syphilis in
the defendant.

:C

We do not think the Court will so hold. It certainly required no stretch of the imagination for this jury to find
from the above medical testimony contrary to the defendant's position, nor could it be said that such a finding was
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unsupported by evidence. And it should be here noted that
this is evidence adduced from the defendant's own witness.
We shall hereafter examine the sufficiency of additional
evidence to support the verdict in this case.
Defendant relies heavily upon the expert opinion testimony of Dr. John Landward, a clinical psychologist, who
performed a series of tests upon the defendant such as the
Bender-Gesthalt Motor Test (figure reproduction), the
Wexler Bellview Adult Intelligence Scale Test (block design), and the Rorschach Ink Blot Test (image perception),
from which he ascertained certain sensitivity which, in his
opinion, was an indication of some brain damage in the
defendant (R. 341-346). As a result of these tests Dr.
Landward recommended that the defendant be given an
E. E. G. (electro encephalogram), presumably as a reliable
procedure to confirm his findings (R. 343). As we have
discussed earlier, the electro encephalograph test made upon
the defendant did not indicate any brain impairment (R.
330-331) . Furthermore, Dr. Landward recognized a slight
possibility of an individual being able to falsify his responses so as to obtain a certain test result by design (R.
355). And most important, this witness recognized the element of human error, and particularly his own, to be reckoned with under these test procedures (R. 358). Again
we emphasize that the defendant's claim of "uncontradicted
evidence" does not hold even in the case of his own witnesses. It was properly within the province of this jury
to consider the opinions of these expert witnesses with due
regard for each exception, qualification, conflict or inconsistency contained therein. And this Court should not upset
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the verdict of the jury where the evidence is so clearly
capable of divergent interpretation as that involved herein.
Another witness for the defendant, Dr. Craig Nelson,
a psychiatrist, also testified that it was his opinion that
the defendant acted under an irresistible impulse as the
result of a paranoid and psychotic personality aggravated
by an organic infection of the central nervous system (R.
366-368). He based this opinion upon observations of
slurred speech and methodical rigidness of speech ( perseveration) evidenced by defendant's verbal interview with
him considered in connection with the positive reaction of
the spinal fluid tests (R. 361, 363, 370). Upon cross examination, Doctor Nelson admitted that slurring of speech
doesn't necessarily indicate brain infection (R. 369). Thus
it is evident that the spinal fluid tests were of primary
importance to this doctor's opinion. The uncertainties surrounding the conclusiveness of these tests in diagnosing
syphilis have heretofore been discussed, and the jury certainly had the right to consider all aspects of the evidence
in its evaluation. Furthermore, there is a manifest inconsistency between the testimony of Dr. Nelson and Dr. Powell
-the former relying upon claimed abnormalities observed
in the defendant's behavior for his opinion, and the latter
claiming that there were "no clinical signs of syphilis" in
defendant's behavior and that his interview with the defendant did not reveal any abnormality as to judgment and
intellectual functions. Can there be any question that the
jury had the absolute right to resolve this conflict and to
determine the credibility of these witnesses in this matter?
Again we point out to the Court that the above inconsis-
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tencies and uncertainties have arisen from the testimony
of defendant's own witnesses.
In addition to the above, the jury had the testimony
of Dr. William D. Pace, a psychiatrist, who was called by
the State as a rebuttal witness, to consider in arriving at
its verdict. Dr. Pace testified that, as a result of his psychiatric examination of the defendant, it was his opinion
that the defendant was not mentally ill or psychotic (R.
374) . And that he was not suffering from a mental disease,
but rather his actions represented abnormal personality
traits or character traits (R. 375). In answer to the hypothetical question concerning the conditions under which the
shooting occurred, Dr. Pace testified that, in his opinion, the
defendant did know right from wrong, that he did know the
nature of the act he was doing and that he did not control
his impulses but this was not the result of mental disease
(R. 375-378). Upon cross examination by defendant's counsel, Dr. Pace testified that his examination of the defendant
did not reveal any organic disorder and that he observed
nothing unusual about the defendant's speech, nor did the
personal history given by the defendant indicate that his
behavior since childhood was the result of syphilis (R. 380382).
The defendant takes the position that no conflict exists between the testimony of Dr. Pace and his own expert
witnesses primarily on the ground that Dr. Pace allegedly
made no inquiry into the possibility of an organic mental
disease. In answer to this point we quote the following
from line 30, page 280, to line 15, page 281 of the record
on appeal:
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"Q. Well, did you when you examined Mr.
Rodgers here, did you find any evidence at all of
any organic disorder?
"A. No I didn't.
"Q. Did you notice any slurring of speech, for
example, which might have shown you that he ~as
inarticulate and that he couldn't talk properly which
might indicate an organic disorder?
"A. I didn't notice anything unusual about his
speech. He talked very freely.
"Q. He talked freely, but I meant by that did
you notice any slurring of the words that he used?
"A. I didn't notice any.
"Q. Was there anything else that was brought
out in your examination that would indicate any
possibility of organic trouble in this man's mind?
"A. No, I saw nothing whatever that would
indicate organic changes in the central nervous system." (Emphasis added.)

In answer to defendant's claim that Dr. Pace's examination was perfunctory, superficial and without sufficient
inquiry into the condition of the defendant, we bring to
the Court's attention that his examination of two hours
duration (R. 374) exceeded the time consumed by Dr. Nelson in his examination of defendant by one-half hour, (R.
360) and equalled the time spent by Dr. Landward in his
interview with the defendant (R. 353). There is no claim
made by defendant that Dr. Pace was not qualified to make
~ a psychiatric examination of equal dignity with that of his
1: own expert witnesses. His only complaint is that Dr. Pace
W did not agree with his witnesses. This is not sufficient to
~~ allow collateral attack upon the unwanted testimony. We
think the above recital clearly indicates a conflict of opinion
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between the defendant's expert witnesses and the plaintiff's
rebuttal witness, in addition to the conflicts inherent in the
testimony of defendant's own witnesses as heretofore set
forth. Where there is a conflict of evidence, a verdict cannot be reversed upon appeal on the ground that it is not
supported by evidence. Lee v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 95 U. 445, 82 P. 2d 178. It was also held in the Lee
case that it is for the jury to decide a question upon which
expert witnesses disagree. This is in accord with the general rule that the value of conflicting expert testimony is
not determined by the numerical weight thereof. Simonet
v. Frank F. Pellissier & Sons, 61 Cal. App. 2d 41, 141 P. 2d
922; Appeal of City of Pittsburg, 350 Pa. 421, 39 A. 2d 601;
Monark Battery Co. v. Industrial Commission, 354 Ill. 494,
188 N. E. 413; Putnam v. Murden, 97 Ind. App. 313, 184
N. E. 796; Ferguson v. Department of Labor and Industries of U'ashington, 197 Wash. 524, 85 P. 2d 1072, reversed on other grounds 90 P. 2d 280; Ramberg v. Morgan,
209 Iowa 474, 218 N. ,V. 492. In the Simonet case the jury
chose to accept the medical testimony of plaintiff's single
expert witness instead of the medical evidence introduced
by the defendant's five expert witnesses. In sustaining the
right of the jury to so decide the court stated as follows,
at page 924, 141 P. 2d Reporter:

"* * * As to the probative value of such
testimony, there can be no significance attached ~o
the fact that the score was five to one. The court lS
not bound to decide in conformity with the declarations of anr number of witnesses, which do not
produce conviction in the mind of the court, agai~
a }pss number or against a presumption or other evidence * * * "
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In addition to the medical testimony in this case, it is
clear that the defendant acted in the most deliberate and
premeditated manner. Contrary to defendant's allegation
that he acted under an "irresistible impulse" or "delusion"
the plaintiff submits that defendant's actions in securing
the murder weapon and his calmly smoking a cigarette as
he awaited the filling of a dump truck from a power shovel
operated by his intended victim, after which he shot once
into the ground and motioned to his victim to come down
from his position on the shovel and then repeatedly shot
his victim to death, indicate that this killing was not the
result of "impulsive" action or "delusions" (R. 135-140,
160-161, 167, 173, 179-183, 200-201, 218-219).

CONCLUSION
Defendant's appeal in this case should be denied and
the verdict and judgment of the District Court in this matter should be affirmed upon the following grounds :

~

1. The conviction of defendant for first degree murder
upon an information filed by the District Attorney charging the commission by defendant of the crime of "murder
in the first degree", following the filing of a complaint and
preliminary hearing upon the charge of murder did not
violate the laws of the State of Utah, the Constitution of
the State of Utah nor the Constitution of the United States
of America.

2. The lower court did not err in denying defendant's
motion to quash the information.
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3. The lower court did not err in overruling the defendant's motion to quash the information or, in lieu thereof, to amend the information to conform to the charge as
made in the original complaint.
4. The lower court did not err in overruling the defendant's objection to the introduction of any testimony
with respect to first degree murder.
5. The lower court did not err in overruling defendant's motion in arrest of judgment.
6. The lower court did not err in overruling defendant's motion for a new trial in that the verdict is supported by the evidence which was sufficient for the jury
to conclude that the defendant was not insane and incapable
of controlling his actions by reason of an organic mental
disease.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
JACK L. CRELLIN,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

